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ABSTRACT 
Reed M. Wood: Caught in the Vice: Economic Sanctions and State Repression in Developing 
Nations 
(Under the direction of Mark Crescenzi) 
Since the Second World War economic sanctions have become a favorite tool of 
foreign policy.  However, the popularity of sanctions has been criticized both because of their 
mixed success and the collateral damage they inflict on civilian populations.  This paper 
examines the impact of United States and United Nations Security Council-imposed 
sanctions on human rights conditions in developing nations.  I show that declining economic 
conditions resulting from sanctions contribute to increases in state-sponsored repression of 
physical integrity rights.  I employ Maximum Likelihood Estimation techniques to test this 
relationship in a sample of 126 developing countries between 1976 and 2001.  The results 
reveal that state-sponsored violations of physical integrity rights in the increase following the 
application of all US sanctions and comprehensive UN sanctions.  This study further finds 
that the severity of the increase in physical repression is dependent on the type of sanctions 
imposed. 
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When you apply that boycott, you have got your hand upon the throat of the offending nation, 
and it is a proper punishment.  
 
—Woodrow Wilson, 1919 Speech before the US Senate in support of the League of Nations. 
 
Sanctions, as is generally recognized, are a blunt instrument. They raise the ethical question 
of whether suffering inflicted on vulnerable groups in the target country is a legitimate 
means of exerting pressure on political leaders whose behavior is unlikely to be affected by 
the plight of their subjects. 
 
—Bhoutros Bhoutros-Ghali, 1995 Agenda for Peace 
 
Introduction 
Following the end of the First Gulf War the World Health Organization (WHO), 
UNICEF, and other humanitarian organizations increasingly voiced concern over the United 
Nations Oil-For-Food-Program.  International health organizations and human rights NGOs 
blamed UN-imposed economic sanctions for the impending humanitarian crisis facing Iraq 
and urged the UN and the United States to reconsider its decision to impose comprehensive 
sanctions on Iraq (see for example UNICEF, 2003 and WHO, 1996).  The graphic evidence 
from Iraq of the sanctions regime’s unintended consequences prompted then UN Secretary-
General Bhoutros-Ghali acknowledged the “blunt instrument” of sanctions hampered the 
work of humanitarian and human rights groups, resulted in long-term reversals in economic 
development in the target country, unjustly injured neighboring states, and could possibly 
strengthen the targeted regime (Bhoutros-Ghali, 1995: paragraphs 70-71).  By the end of the 
1990s, the dismal situation of Iraqi civilians and the failure of sanctions to oust the Hussein 
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regime led many policy advisors, international lawyers, and scholars of international 
relations to question both the efficacy and morality of economic sanctions.  
While intended as a non-violent foreign policy alternative to war, sanctions have 
often worsened the human rights situation in the target country and led to increased physical 
repression.  Particularly vulnerable—and most commonly the target of sanctions—are the 
underdeveloped and developing nations of the global south.  Academic researchers and 
journalists have documented and analyzed the adverse social and economic impact of 
sanctions, including their deleterious effect on public health systems, the reduction of per 
capita GDP, rising prices of staple goods, increased unemployment, infant mortality, 
malnutrition, the spread of infectious disease, migration, and the breakdown of traditional 
family structures.   
This paper examines the relationship between sanctions and increased violations of 
physical integrity rights—a subset of human rights that includes freedom from abuses such as 
torture, extrajudicial execution, and disappearance— in the target country.  Specifically, this 
paper reveals that state-sponsored violations of physical integrity rights increase following 
the application of United States or United Nations Security Council economic sanctions on a 
target country.  This analysis offers support for many of the normative claims made by 
human rights activists and verifies the substantive arguments of previous case studies that 
have claimed sanctions impose undue political, physical, and social hardship on innocent 
civilians. 
The paper proceeds as follows: I first review prior research in the human rights 
impact of sanctions.  I then construct a theoretical explanation for the observed increase in 
human rights abuses following the imposition of unilateral or multilateral sanctions.  Next, I 
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conduct a quantitative analysis using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) that provides 
evidence for the theoretical relationship between sanctions and increased violations of 
physical integrity rights.  In the final sections, I discuss the results of this analysis and 
describe avenues for future research.   
Previous Research: The Efficacy and Effects of Sanctions 
While sanctions and other forms of economic statecraft are often presented as a 
modern, enlightened tool of foreign policy, the implementation of sanctions as a coercive 
force or punitive measure dates to at least the early Greek city-states (Askari et al., 2003: 5; 
Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, 1983: 4).  From the ancient world through the modern day, 
economic warfare in the forms of embargos, blockades, and sieges has been a common tactic 
in the conduct of foreign policy (Askari et al., 2003; Hufbauer et al., 1983; Naylor, 2001; 
Simmons, 1999).  During the interwar years of the 20th century, sanctions became a 
legitimate instrument of international politics under the League of Nations as a perceived less 
destructive method of punishing rogue regimes and evoking changes in domestic or foreign 
policies considered threatening to international peace and security.   
In spite of the lengthy and colorful history enjoyed by sanctions, only recently have they 
become a favorite too of statecraft.  According to a 1998 policy brief from the Institute for 
International Economics, during the late 1990s the United States imposed or continued 
sanctions against 26 nations (Hufbauer, 1998; see also Weiss et al, 1997).  These sanctions 
ranged from foreign aid retractions to economic embargos, and by some counts affected the 
lives of nearly half of the world’s inhabitants.  Sanctions had become such a common tool of 
US foreign policy by the late 1990s that president Bill Clinton, in a 1998 interview with CBS 
news, lamented that the United States had become “sanctions happy.”  
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The United States was not unique in this turn toward sanctions as a favorite choice 
from the foreign policy toolbox.  During the 1990s, international organizations and states 
alike increasingly employed economic sanctions.  The United Nations, the Organization of 
American States (OAS), the Organization for African Unity (OAU), the European Union 
(EU), France, the United Kingdom, and Japan imposed economic sanctions on developing 
states in order to restore or promote democracy, halt civil or international violence, promote 
basic human rights, or stop nuclear proliferation.  This trend toward sanctioning earned the 
1990s the dubious title “The Sanctions Decade” (see for example Cortright and Lopez, 
2000).   Excluding UN cases, the use of sanctions increased 22% during the 1990s as 
compared to the previous decade (IIE, 2005).  More dramatically, prior to 1990 the United 
Nations Security Council invoked chapter VII of the UN Charter in order to impose sanctions 
on only two nations: Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.  However, since 1990 the Security 
Council approved sanctions against Afghanistan, Angola, Cote d’ Ivoire, Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Sudan, and Yugoslavia. This 
represents approximately a 700% increase in the use of sanctions in just over a decade.  
Despite the increasing popularity of sanctions, significant debate exists as to their 
effectiveness.  According to Hufbauer et al. (1990), only one in three sanctions events 
between 1900 and 1990 and only one in four since 1973 achieved their stated goals or 
resulted in discernible changes in the behavior of the target regime.  Other scholars gauge the 
success of sanctions as even lower.  Robert Pape (1997), for example, concludes that the 
actual rate of success of sanctions in altering policy is likely closer to 5%.  Likewise, Cooper 
Drury (1998) asserts that Hufbauer et al.’s analysis of sanctions and their policy 
recommendations beg revision, arguing that sanctions are far less effective than the authors 
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conclude in their study.  Other scholars, however, suggests that sanctions may be more 
effective than earlier empirical research contends.  Daniel Drezner (2003) asserts that 
sanctions are applied only to the toughest cases—that is, sanctions are only considered after 
negotiations and diplomatic approaches have failed.  Moreover, he argues that the lack of 
observed success in sanctions is the result of a selection bias in the research and not a failing 
of sanctions themselves.  According to his analysis, the threat of sanctions is often enough to 
prompt changes in the behavior of some states, and that focusing only on cases where 
sanctions are actually applied ignores the large number of episodes where the threat of 
economic coercion did result in policy changes (Drezner, 2003).   There is also evidence that 
sanctions may be effective in promoting domestic changes within the target state.  Recently, 
Nikolay Marinov has shown that sanctions successfully destabilize targeted leaders and may 
positively contribute to transition from authoritarianism to democracy (Marinov, 2005; 
unpublished manuscript).         
A parallel debate has also emerged regarding the unexpected consequences of 
sanctions.  The well-publicized collateral damage caused by sanctions imposed on Iraq 
between 1990 and 2003 prompted questions regarding the trade off between the possibility of 
future success and the likelihood of immediate civilian suffering.  That is, sanctions may be a 
successful policy prescription in some cases.  However they are perhaps more akin to 
chemotherapy than strategic surgery—despite the chance of ultimate success, the side effects 
of treatment may be as unpleasant as the disease itself.   
Recently, a number of scholars have addressed this issue.  According to one line of 
thought, sanctions may increase political cohesion within the target state and may result in a 
“rally around the flag” effect, strengthening the position of the sanctioned regime against 
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both internal and external political threats (Galtung, 1967; Weiss et al., 1997; Kaempfer et 
al., 2004).  Furthermore, travel bans and other sanctions hinder the ability of NGOs to 
perform humanitarian services and may undermine political opposition by reducing their 
contact with international NGOs and other transnational actors (Cortright and Lopez, 2000: 
214).  Sanctions may bolster the incumbent regime, weaken political and civil society, and 
endanger potential political opposition.  Consequently, the observed effect of sanctions is 
often quite different from their intended effect.   
Similarly, increased nationalist sentiment, support for the incumbent regime, and 
animosity toward the sender state(s) result because civilians rather than political elites often 
endure the worst of the negative effects (Galtung, 1967; Haass, 1998: 201-202; Preeg, 1999: 
7).  Sanctions may also generate support for the regime and strengthen its resolve against the 
sender nation, leading to diplomatic and political stalemate (Hufbauer et al., 1983: 11; 
Cortright and Lopez, 2002: 14-15).  The upsurge in popular support of Milosevic’s 
government following the application of US and UN sanctions stemmed from the regime’s 
demonization of the US and its allies, the wide-spread belief in UN hidden agendas, and 
propaganda focused on western imperialist schemes “set upon suffocating the FRY 
economy” (Heine-Ellison, 2001: 98).  Sanctions consequently emboldened the regime to 
carry out further abuses against minorities and opposition groups and strengthened its resolve 
against the west.      
Previous research demonstrates that sanctions reduce aggregate trade, lead to 
scarcities in staple goods, stifle economic development, inflate prices, worsen 
unemployment, erode public health standards, and contribute to higher rates of infectious 
disease, increased infant mortality, and malnutrition (see for example Ali and Shah, 2000; 
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Cortright and Lopez, 2000; Crawford, 1997; Garfield, 2002; Garfield and Santana, 1999; 
Garfield, Devin and Fausey, 1995; Hoskins, 1997; Joyner, 2003; Weiss, Cortright, Lopez and 
Minear, 1997).  While the extent of economic decline and relative privation varies from 
country to country, sanctions imposed on developing countries exacerbate the already poor 
economic conditions.   
Sanctions may result in detrimental changes in the economic and security structures 
of the target state.   Peter Andreas (2005) demonstrates that arms and fuel embargos and 
other sanctions imposed on Croatia and Yugoslavia contributed to smuggling, black market 
trade, crime syndicates, and other aspects of “uncivil society.”  In his assessment, 
sanctions—particularly long-term sanctions—create a symbiotic relationship between the 
state and organized crime that in time sublimates the natural economy of the country and 
leads to the creation of black market or shadow economy, replete with severe social and 
economic ailments (336).  The increasingly interconnected relationship between state 
authorities and crime syndicates produces illegal commodity monopolies, price increases, 
and rising crime activity in the targeted country (Andreas, 2005; Heine-Ellison, 2001; 
Naylor, 2001: 3-4).  Smuggling and the trafficking of drugs, weapons, women, children, and 
illicit commodities also increase under the shadow economies created by sanctions.  Such 
was the case in Iraq under the much-maligned Oil for Food Program in Iraq where both crime 
syndicates and the Hussein regime profited mightily from smuggling oil and other 
commodities and in Yugoslavia and Croatia, where the imposition of sanctions created and 
fed fuel and arms smuggling rings that extended throughout the Balkans (Andreas, 2005; 
Hein-Ellison, 2001). 
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Finally, sanctions produce unintended consequences beyond the target state.  Several 
studies suggest that sanctions may negatively affect the sender nation as well as the target 
state, leading to millions of dollars of lost revenue annually, job cuts, and price increases.  
According to some analyses, reductions in bilateral trade caused by unilateral sanctions cost 
US companies between $5 and $20 billion annually (Hufbauer et al, 1997; Hufbauer and 
Oegg, 2003: 311; Lash, 1999: 13).  These lost revenues further impacted the American 
economy through the loss of thousands of export-related jobs during the 1990s (Hufbauer, 
1999: 92; Lash, 1999: 15).  Recent research also suggests sanctions negatively affect states 
not directly included in the foreign policy calculus of sanctions. These “innocent bystander” 
states—typically nations contiguous to the target with a strong trade relationship—
experience detrimental economic spill over from the target state (Askari et al., 2003: 186, 
Ataov, 38: 1997; Haass, 1998: 201; Slavov, 2003).  For example, the economic decline 
brought about by the imposition of US, OAS, and UN sanctions imposed on Haiti resulted in 
a swell of refugees to the Dominican Republic, the United States, and other neighboring 
countries.  Likewise, US and UN-embargoes imposed against Croatia and Yugoslavia led to 
fuel smuggling, arms trafficking, and other illicit trade in Romania, Bulgaria, and other 
Balkan states (Andreas, 2005; Heine-Ellison, 2001).   
The mixed evidence for the success of sanctions coupled with the potential for 
adverse consequences have led many politicians and policy makers to questions both the 
appropriateness and the ethics of imposing sanctions.  Policy briefs drafted for the Clinton 
administration addressed these issues, concluding that current US unilateral sanctions had 
typically failed to achieve their policy objectives, reduced US prestige as a world power, 
created rifts between the US and its allies, and at times negatively impacted the populations 
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of the target countries (Collins and Bowdoin, 1999 and Johnston and Weintraub, 1999).  
These briefs recommend alternatives to the use of sanctions and significant changes in 
sanctions when they were imposed.   
Other nations and multinational organizations have also turned a more critical eye 
toward sanctions policy.  In 1998, 1999, and 2000 the German and Swiss governments, in 
association with NGOs, academics, and international lawyers, bankers, and diplomats, 
sponsored seminars focusing on the development of smarter sanctions policy (Cortright and 
Lopez, 2002).  The Interlaken Process and the Bonn-Berlin Process evaluated the impact of 
current sanctions and worked to develop more specifically targeted sanctions.  The UN has 
also recently begun to reevaluate its own sanctions policies.  A policy assessment prepared in 
1999 by the United Nations Sanctions Secretariat encouraged the Security to Council to 
explore “smarter” sanctions (United Nations, 1999).  Smart or targeted sanctions—arms 
embargoes, travel bans, and the freezes on public and/or private assets—are designed to 
minimize the collateral damage to civilians that often results from traditional sanctions 
policies while still pinching political elites and limiting their capacity to carry out policies 
unfavorable to the international community (see also Hufbauer and Oegg, 2000).   
Sanctions and State Repression 
Sanctions may also contribute to an increase in political repression and the violation 
of physical security.  The imposition of sanctions may create conditions that worsen state-
sponsored violations of physical security rights such as political killings, torture, or arbitrary 
detentions.  Thus far, however, research in this field has overlooked the important linkage 
between the imposition of sanctions and increased physical repression in the target state.             
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Sanctions are increasingly favored—particularly among Western states—as an 
alternative to armed intervention in leveraging states toward compliance with international 
human rights laws and norms.  Given their frequent use during the last decade, an expanding 
number of the world’s citizens are exposed to the effects of sanctions.  Establishing a 
relationship between sanctions and increased political and physical repression by the targeted 
government runs counter to the perceived legitimacy (and possibly legality) of sanctions as 
an alternative to military intervention.  Evidence of a causal connection places responsibility 
for increases in state repression at least partially in the hands of the sender nation.   
This relationship proves particularly troubling for nations or organizations that use 
the defense of human rights as a basis for the imposition of sanctions.  Western states and the 
United Nations would then be forced to reconcile their desired foreign policy outcomes with 
the possibility that the imposed sanctions regime would increase levels of political repression 
in the target state and might threaten the physical security of its citizens.  When sanctions 
contribute to further violations of physical security in the target state, they should be viewed 
not only as policy failures but also as morally contradictory policies.   
In recent decades the individual states and multinational organizations have applied 
sanctions to states that have exhibited gross and systematic violations of the human rights 
provisions enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.  A cursory review of the case histories of sanctions applied by the United States (see 
Hufbauer et al., 1990; Hufbauer, 1998; IIE, 2005) reveals that human rights concerns—
political repression, political violence, genocide, torture, and unlawful imprisonments—
figure prominently as justification for the imposition of sanctions.  In 1973 the United States 
Congress approved legislation that required the retraction of US foreign aid to countries 
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demonstrating a pattern of blatant disregard for basic human rights.1  If the promotion or 
restoration of democracy is included as an aspect of human rights, then such concerns are 
among the most frequent justifications for the imposition of sanctions by the United States 
since the mid-1970s.  In fact, language regarding human rights appears in roughly 60% of the 
sanctions legislation imposed between 1975 and 1999.2   Similarly, the United Nations 
Security Council has cited human rights violations committed as the justification for 
sanctions in accordance with the United Nations Charter.  Resolutions specifying the legal 
arguments for the imposition of sanctions by the United Nations frequently refer to the gross 
abuse of basic physical integrity by the targeted government as one component of that 
regime’s threat to international peace and stability. 
While human rights concerns have often been the impetus for imposing sanctions 
during the past three decades, empirical evidence suggests that rather than altering the 
behavior of abusive regimes, sanctions may directly and negatively impact human rights 
conditions in the target state.  This presents sender states and institutions with an obvious 
dilemma—can a policy that impinges upon human rights of citizens be a legitimate tool for 
the punishment of human rights abusing regimes?  The possibility that sanctions could result 
in greater political repression and declining respect for the physical security of citizens runs 
counter to the proposed objective of many sanctions imposed by the UN and a number of 
Western nations.  The nature of this relationship deserves consideration.  In this paper I 
examine the effect of sanctions on government respect for physical integrity rights—the 
                                                
1   I should note here that this legislation included clauses that exempted many states deemed as important to 
national security, mostly US Cold War allies.  Consequently, a number of serious human rights abusers were 
never the subjects of the sanctions intended by Congress. 
 
2   This count is based on the justifications for the imposition of sanctions as reported in “Chronological 
Summary of Economic Sanctions for Foreign Policy Goals, 1914-1999.”  I included in this count all mention of 
human rights, democracy, political repression, political violence, and similar terminology.   
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subset of human rights that includes freedom from extrajudicial execution, torture, political 
imprisonment, and disappearances.  
Toward a Theory of Sanctions and State Repression 
While the impact of sanctions depends on factors such as the economic relationship 
between sender and target, the severity and duration of the sanctions regime, and the 
availability of substitute trade or aid partners, sanctions almost invariable impose some 
economic burden on the target state.  In less developed states in particular—the targets of 
most of sanctions events—the imposition of sanctions often results in significant trade 
reductions, falling GDP, rising prices, and increased unemployment (Crawford, 1997; 
Garfield and Santana, 1999; Joyner, 2003).  Economic decline negatively affects both 
political elites and citizens alike; however, the distribution of these negative consequences is 
mediated by the political and social structure of the target country.  Specifically, non-
democratic political institutions allow political elites to shift costs onto the larger 
populations, thus shielding themselves from much of the damage.   
The ability of incumbent leaders and political elites to transfer the cost of sanctions 
downward is central to the relationship between sanctions and increased state-sponsored 
violations of physical security rights.  I argue that sanctions promote physical repression in 
two ways.  On the one hand, when the imposition of sanctions creates a “rally round the flag” 
effect the cost of repressing potential political rivals decreases.   The strongly nationalistic 
environment created by sanctions lowers the cost of repression and allows leaders to more 
easily pursue policies designed to undermine and eliminate potential challengers.  On the 
other, the public may blame the national leadership for declining economic and social 
conditions.  Public dissatisfaction may then lead to protests, political instability, and 
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increased support for the opposition.  To suppress dissent and enforce loyalty, autocratic 
leaders increasingly rely on repression.  I discuss both scenarios in turn. 
 
Political Institutions and Social Outcomes 
 
The structural differences between autocracies and democracies determine the ability 
of leaders to redistribute the costs of unfavorable policies such as sanctions.  Because of the 
constraints placed on democratic leaders by the electoral process, democratic leaders cannot 
easily transfer the cost of sanctions onto the public without facing significant punishment 
during the next election.  While strong nationalistic sentiment may allow a leader to pursue 
policies that perpetuate sanctions, when economic decline resulting from sanctions exceeds 
the willingness of the population to support the policies of its leaders, incumbents or their 
party will face removal from office.  Therefore, there exists some limitation on the 
government’s prerogative in democratic systems, preventing leaders from transferring the 
adverse effects of policy decisions to the population as a whole or onto specific groups 
within in the country.  In non-democratic systems national leaders are often more successful 
at redistributing the costs of policy choices.  Because of the absence of electoral constraints, 
autocratic leaders often act with impunity and disregard for the negative impact policy 
decisions may exert on citizens.  This is not to say that autocrats act completely 
independently; leaders of non-democratic regimes must maintain the support and loyalty of 
some group of political elites in order to sustain their positions of power.  Because this core 
group of political elites rather than the population as a whole maintains the autocrat, the 
effect of policy choices on this group is a primary concern of autocratic incumbents.  
Consequently, so long as an autocratic leader can redirect costs to the general population 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
14
while shielding this core group of political elites from significant negative effects, then the 
leader need not fear immediate punitive response. 
 
Maintaining the Winning Coalition 
The dynamics of political survival are pivotal in understanding the relationship 
between economic sanctions and increased political repression.  The well-known selectorate 
model (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) is useful in examining this relationship.  According 
to this model, leaders maintain control by constructing and maintaining a winning coalition 
made up of members of the selectorate (the total body of persons able to select national 
leadership).  Failing to maintain the continued flow of resources and other benefits to the 
winning coalition increases the likelihood of defection and thus increases the probability of 
loss of power.  In order to prevent the defection of members of the winning coalition from 
the incumbent to a challenger—thereby threatening the stability of the regime—the 
incumbent must credibly promise more to his winning coalition than can the challenger.  
When an incumbent can no longer commit to “deliver the goods” to his winning coalition, an 
opportunity for usurpation by a challenger presents itself.   
This is exactly the logic behind the application of sanctions.  By placing the 
leadership of a state in the vice of economic sanctions, sender nations attempt to pinch the 
incumbent to the point that he can no longer provide the necessary incentives to his winning 
coalition, thereby creating the opportunity for regime change and emboldening domestic 
political opposition.  The effectiveness of sanctions is contingent on the ability of the 
sanctions to restrict the flow of resources from the incumbent to the wining coalition.  Given 
that the winning coalition in an autocracy, sanctions need to reduce the flow of resources to 
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enough of the regime’s supporters that the size of the opposition’s coalition exceeds that of 
the incumbent’s supporters.  Sufficient defections tip the balance of power, possibly resulting 
in the ouster of the incumbent regime.3  The likelihood of the success of sanctions thus 
increases when sanctions curtail the flow of resources from incumbent to supporters, 
resulting in some number of defections from incumbent to opposition.  
In order to prevent defection from the winning coalition, autocrats must employ some 
combination of carrots and sticks.  In the former, the incumbent regime continues to supply 
supporters with a flow of resources greater than those that could be promised by any 
challenger.  In the latter, the regime resorts to punitive measures and repression in order 
enforce loyalty.  The imposition of economic sanctions makes the credible promise of 
resources more difficult because under sanctions economic constraints tighten and resource 
availability declines throughout the sanctioned state.   Therefore, sanctioned incumbents 
must either find alternative sources of income or increase their level of repression in order to 
maintain their coalition.   
To maintain the flow of resources to the winning coalition, leaders may turn to 
alternative sources of revenue such as smuggling and trade in illicit goods.  The imposition of 
economic sanctions may provide a boon for the leadership of the target state.  Andreas (2005) 
shows that sanctions can create symbiotic relationship between the state and organized crime, 
leading to the sublimation the normal economy of the country and, over time, to the creation 
of a shadow economy.  Collusion between organized crime and the government of the 
sanctioned state allows the incumbent regime to collect significant rents through smuggling, 
illegal trade, and sanctions busting.  Kaempfer et al. (2004: 38) demonstrate that sanctions 
                                                
3   This is the argument behind more recent targeted sanctions.  That is, when sanctions can specifically target 
political elites and undermine the flow of goods between incumbents and their wining coalitions, sanctions 
should be more successful at promoting defections and thus ousting the regime. 
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allow incumbent autocrats to capture rents without increasing the cost of loyalty in the 
wining coalition.  These rents accrue directly to the regime and its wining coalition, which 
allows the incumbent to ensure a steady flow of resources and benefits to supporters despite 
economic decline in the rest of the county (39).  Saddam Hussein garnered substantial rents 
through oil smuggling and taxes and illegal surcharges billed to the UN Oil-for-Food 
Program while the Iraqi economy collapsed According to a recent Washington Post article, 
the Hussein regime garnered some $1.7 billion in kickback from companies participating in 
the Oil-for-Food program and over $11 billion from oil smuggling (Lynch, 2005).  Similarly, 
during the civil conflicts in the former Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic and his supporters 
profited under sanctions through the creation of state-owned monopolies, fuel smuggling, 
and illicit trade, and in Croatia Tudjman’s regime earned rents through fuel and arms 
smuggling from neighboring countries (Andreas, 2005; Heine-Ellison, 2001; Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg, 1999). 
Despite the emergence of a shadow economy tacitly supported by the incumbent 
regime and its apparatus, financial flows and the distribution of resources are unlikely to 
remain at pre-sanction levels.  Autocrats may then rely on the stick in order to prevent 
defection and enforce loyalty in both the winning coalition as well as rest of the selectorate.  
Political elites have access to sanctions rents or may receive side payments from the 
incumbent.4  Most citizens, however, do not enjoy the same captured rents that benefit 
political elites.  The ability of the incumbent to transfer the cost of sanctions from the 
winning coalition to the rest of the population worsens the economic effects of sanctions in 
                                                
4   Few if any sanctions regimes are 100% effective at restricting the flow of restricted goods.  In the majority of 
cases, smuggling, sanctions busting, and black market trade in restricted commodities are common side effects.  
Moreover, these activities often provide lucrative sources of rents for political elites.  See for example, Alder-
Karlsson, 1982 and Kaempfer et al., 2004. 
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the rest of the country.  As costs are redistributed and transferred downward, the negative 
consequences of sanctions are likely to fall disproportionately on the most vulnerable 
segment of society (Preeg, 1999: 7).  
 
The Logic of Political Repression 
 
When an incumbent either cannot or will not continue to offer carrots—public goods 
or side payments—to the selectorate, he will necessarily turn to the stick in order to enforce 
stability and quash potential challengers.  The unequal distribution of costs resulting from 
sanctions contributes to tensions between the incumbent and some segments of the 
selectorate.  The severity of these tensions and the proportion of the selectorate to which they 
extend are determined by the ability of the sanctioned leader to direct public blame toward 
the sender nations.  When the leader can successfully shift blame for sanctions externally and 
toward the sender state, the rally round the flag effect will result in greater support for the 
incumbent.  If instead the public places the blame for its economic hardship at the feet of the 
incumbent, tensions between the incumbent and the public will increase.  In either case, 
sanctions are likely to contribute to an observable increase in physical repression and 
violations of personal security rights. 
  On the one hand, the incumbent is successful in shifting blame for failing economic 
conditions from the leadership to the sender nation a “rally round the flag” effect will often 
lower the price of loyalty to the regime.  International sanctions undermine political 
opposition in the target country and may strengthen the winning coalition of the incumbent 
regime (Cortright and Lopez, 2000: 214; Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999).  The weakening 
of domestic opposition groups reduces the cost autocrats must exert in order to repress their 
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potential challengers.  Therefore, repression against opposition groups may increase under 
sanctions.  Kaempfer et al. (2004) employ a game theoretic model to demonstrate that when 
the rally round the flag effect dominates, the power of the regime increases relative to the 
power of the opposition.  As the power of the opposition decreases, the cost of repression 
decreases as well.  Consequently, sanctions may increase the target regime’s incentive and 
ability to repress potential challengers by lowering the cost of repression.  Sanctions imposed 
on Yugoslavia and Iraq produced this effect.  In both cases, the incumbent regimes 
successfully increased repression against their political opponents—Hussein increasingly 
targeted Kurds and Shiites, and Milosevic ratcheted up repression against ethnic Albanians in 
Kosovo.  As support for the incumbent regime and contempt for the sanctioning states grew, 
the power of the opposition declined.  Owing to the upsurge of nationalistic sentiment, 
political opponents became easy targets of state repression and violent reprisals.              
On the other hand, sanctions may create tensions between the public and the 
incumbent, leading to protest and instability and increasing support for the opposition.  In 
this case, the opposition increasingly poses a serious challenge to the incumbent regime.  
Dictators are typically aware of the degree of repression that is necessary to subdue political 
challenges.  Assuming leaders are rational actors, they are aware of the incentive to increase 
repression when exogenous shocks provoke a disaffected or dissatisfied public into protest, 
revolt, or other challenge to the status quo.  As costs are increasingly transferred downward 
from the incumbent and his coalition to the population, loyalty to the regime begins to waver.  
Correlatively, support for the opposition may increase as a politically and increasingly 
economically oppressed public examines possible alternatives to the political status quo.  
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Certainly there exists some threshold for rebellion or mass public demonstration 
despite the possibility of severe consequences.  At some point, the selectorate of a sanctioned 
state challenges the incumbent regime rather than continuing to endure the hardships 
imposed by sanctions.  This threshold is determined by a number of different factors and 
varies from country to country.  However, that some tipping point exists is a logical 
assumption.  Likewise, the type of response is contingent on a number of structural, social, 
and historical factors.  In countries with some level of respect for free expression citizens are 
likely to first turn to organized protests or public demonstrations in an attempt to alter the 
policy choice of incumbent regime.  Faced with rising expressions of public dissatisfaction, 
incumbents may employ more repressive measures in order to halt popular protests, 
demonstrations, or other signs of political instability.  For example, the use of excessive force 
against public demonstrations, arbitrary detentions of protesters or activists, and the violent 
attacks against opposition leaders are common responses for transitional regimes and other 
quasi-democratic regimes that face pressure from a disaffected population.  
In states where public expression of disfavor with the incumbent regime is strictly 
proscribed, support for potential political challengers may begin to increase.  As pressure 
from political opponents increases, reprisals from the incumbent regime also increase.  
Fearing the increased possibility of civil revolt or defection from the winning coalition to the 
coalition of the political opposition, incumbents will ratchet-up repression in the hopes of 
quashing support for potential challengers.  According to Bueno de Mesquita et al., “to 
restore deterrence the intensity of repression should increase with the gains a challenger can 
expect if he succeeds in becoming a leader” (2003: 340).  The greater the divide between the 
benefits procured by the incumbent regime and potential opponents, the greater the 
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likelihood of a challenge to the status quo.  As this divide widens as a result of sanctions, 
challenges to the incumbent increase.   And as the probability of political challenge increases, 
the incumbent’s incentive to increase repression in order to “restore deterrence” increases as 
well.   
This applies to potential political opposition from both the incumbent’s own winning 
coalition and selectorate as well those disenfranchised by the extant political structure.  As 
the likelihood of defections from the winning coalition increases, the incumbent resorts to 
violence in order to prevent future defections.  The brutal and frequent political killings of 
military officers and cabinet members in the Hussein government graphically illustrate this 
point.  The same applies to selectors.  As the potential benefit derived from unseating the 
incumbent increase, the leader’s incentive to use repression increases. 
The disenfranchised have the greatest incentive to oppose the incumbent regime or 
support political opposition when the regime is based on a small wining coalition and 
provides few public goods.  (Beuno de Mesquita et al., 2003: 342).  As sanctions reduce the 
availability of public resources and contribute to general economic decay, disenfranchised 
citizens have more incentive to participate in violent opposition.  Non-democratic 
incumbents must in turn increase repression in order to stamp out this opposition.               
Past research on the economic sources of revolution, political violence, and civil war 
supports the theoretical assertion that relative depravation increases the likelihood of political 
instability, and therefore repression.   Recent studies demonstrate that the likelihood of civil 
unrest and political violence declines as international trade, foreign investment increase, and 
economic development increase (Barbieri and Reuveny, 2005; Krause and Suzuki, 2005; Li 
and Schaub, 2005; Suzuki and Krause, 2005).  It is then reasonable to conclude that when 
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these indicators decline the reverse is also true.  That is, under conditions of negative growth 
protest, civil violence, and repression are likely to increase.   
Similarly, when income inequality increases, the potential for civil violence increases 
(Cramer, 2003).  Sanctions promote an inequitable redistribution of resources: incumbent 
leaders transfer costs downward in order to protect the winning coalition and prevent 
defection.  The economic divide between elites and average citizens increases under 
sanctions, which increases tensions and may lead to civil unrest and violence.  In response, 
the incumbent regime resorts to repressive measures in order to combat this unrest, maintain 
social stability, and prevent the growth of political dissent.  This effect is particularly strong 
in states where one ethnic or religious group receives disproportionate economic benefits 
(Besancon, 2005).  Sanctions against Iraq, Rhodesia, South Africa, and Yugoslavia further 
exacerbated existing racial, religious, or ethnic tensions and led to increased communal 
violence in the country and greater state repression during the sanctions years.  
To summarize, in order to prevent defection from his coalition to the opponent’s 
coalition (and thus the possible overthrow of the regime), the incumbent must therefore 
increase the flow of the resources to his own coalition.  The budget constraints of the 
incumbent, however, determine the ability to manipulate resource flows.  When insufficient 
resources exist to maintain the winning coalition or to prevent mass social unrest such as 
public demonstrations, riots, or, depending on the strength of the opposition, revolt, the 
incumbent will likely substitute repression for pay offs.  That is, when there are not enough 
available resources to stave off competition and satisfy the demands of the public, an 
incumbent autocrat augments the level of physical repression in order to extract loyalty from 
the winning coalition and to quash open dissent from the public.  This repression translates in 
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physical terms into increases in the number of extrajudicial executions and politically 
motivates assassinations, arbitrary detentions, the use of torture, and disappearances in order 
to eliminate potential political opponents and to terrorize the public. 
 
A Note about Sanctions and Democracies  
Thus far the theoretical model constructed here has assumed that sanctioned states are 
most likely non-democratic regimes.  The theory presented here suggests that sanctions may 
not exert the same effect in democratic compared to autocratic states.  While sanctions 
contribute to the repression of human rights in autocracies, there is little relationship between 
repression and economic sanctions in established democracies.  This assumption follows 
logically from the model presented above.  Because of the large size of the wining coalition 
relative to the selectorate in democracies, leaders must pursue policies that benefit the largest 
number of citizens.  Democratic leaders therefore expend resources on public goods as 
opposed to transferring private goods to political elites (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).  If 
economic sanctions reduce the level of public goods, voters defect from the incumbent to the 
challenger, thereby removing the incumbent from office.  In this case, the challenger alters 
policies in order to remove sanctions, thus resuming the flow of public goods to the voters.  
This in part explains the rarity of sanctions against democrats.  
Ideally, a more in depth examination of the relationship between government 
structure and changes in state human rights performance under sanctions would be included 
in this paper.  However, two factors complicate such as analysis.  First, previous research 
shows that democratic institutions exert a strong positive effect on state respect for human 
rights, resulting in few violations of physical integrity rights in established democracies (Poe 
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and Tate, 1994; Davenport and Armstrong, 2004).  While democracies occasionally commit 
significant rights abuses, these acts usually coincide with significant communal conflict, civil 
war, or terrorist violence such as in Colombia in the 1980s and 90s, Turkey in the late 1990s, 
and Israel during the First and Second Intifada.  Moreover, it is often difficult to separate the 
violence committed by government security forces from those committed by non-state actors.   
Table 1: Democracy and US Sanctions (by country year) 
Regime Type Mild Sanctions Moderate Sanctions Comprehensive Sanctions Total 
Democracy 32 5 4 41 
Non-Democ. 195 142 126 463 
Total 227 147 130 504 
 
Table 2: Democracy and UN Sanctions (by country year) 
Regime Type Diplomatic Sanctions Moderate Sanctions Extensive Sanctions Total 
Democracy 3 5 3 11 
Non-Democ. 13 61 23 97 
Total 16 66 26 108 
 
Second, democracies represent a small minority of sanctions cases over the past 30 
years.  Furthermore, when democracies are subject to sanctions, the duration of the sanctions 
averages two years or less. Tables 1 and 2 show the relationship between sanctions and 
governmental structure. The particularly small number of sanctions events against 
democracies in this sample—less than 10%—makes it difficult to achieve statistical 
significance using quantitative analysis.  In models containing an interaction variable for 
sanctions and democracy, the term did not approach standard levels of significance and left 
the other results virtually unchanged.   
Scope and Hypotheses  
This study uses a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis of 126 countries for the 
years 1976-2001.  In order to determine the impact of sanctions on developing nations 
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specifically, the data set is limited to countries with a population of more than 500,000 
persons and a per capita GDP of less than approximately $10,0005 for the majority of years 
included in the sample.  While my analysis is limited to a subset of countries in the 
international system, I believe that restricting the sample to developing countries is legitimate 
given that the majority of sanctions events that occurred during this time period were 
imposed on countries with developing and transitional economies.  In fact, each of the US 
and UN sanctions events imposed during this time frame were directed against countries 
falling below this threshold.  Therefore, the results from this analysis provide generalizable 
evidence of the relationship between sanctions events and changing human rights conditions. 
 
Hypotheses 
According to the theory presented above, sanctions negatively impact the general 
economic climate of a target state.  Economic constraints force incumbent leaders to divert 
resources from public goods and into the hands of the incumbent’s winning collation in order 
to prevent defections.  Such economic redistribution also increases the opportunity of 
challengers who can promise an end to sanctions in return for political victory.  Furthermore, 
economic decline may promote dissent among the disenfranchised, potentially leading to 
violence or revolt.  As available resources diminish, incumbents must resort to greater 
repression in order to deter potential political challengers and quash dissent.   This lead to the 
initial set of hypotheses: 
                                                
5 See appendix for countries in sample.  The only states included within both this analysis and in the “high 
income” nation category are South Korea and Israel.  South Korea is included because its per capita GDP only 
exceeds the $10,000 threshold during three years in the mid 1990s, and its average GDP per capita for the time 
period of this analysis falls significantly below $10,000.  Similarly, Israel begins the sample period with a GDP 
far below the $10,000 ceiling and only surpasses it in 1989.  In both cases the states’ GDP per capita exceeds 
the $10,000 threshold for fewer than half of the years included in the sample. 
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H1: The imposition of sanctions by the United States increases the likelihood of 
 repression of physical integrity rights in developing states. 
 
H2: The imposition of sanctions by the United Nations increases the likelihood of 
 repression of physical integrity rights in developing states. 
 
Sanctions events differ significantly in terms of the nature of their constraints.  
Therefore, their effects on repression should differ based on both their comprehensiveness 
and their severity.  Sanctions that are more successful in restricting the resources available to 
incumbents are more likely to force incumbents to resort to increased repression compared to 
sanctions that sanctions that are less effective in restricting this flow.  The ability of sanctions 
to restrict this flow is dependent on the severity of the restrictions imposed and on the 
number of countries imposing these restrictions.  Here severity refers to the specific 
constraints imposed by the sanctions, while comprehensiveness refers to the number of 
countries imposing the sanctions.  Severe sanctions such as embargoes impose more 
constraints on the resources available to incumbents compared to more moderate sanctions 
such as aid retractions.  Therefore, the likelihood of increased repression should be greater 
the more severe the sanctions.  Similarly, the greater the number of nations participating in 
sanctions events, the less opportunity exists for incumbents to find alternative flows of 
resources.  Unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States, for example, still allow 
sanctioned incumbents to turn to other nations to fill the gap created by restriction on US aid 
or trade.  Multilateral sanctions, on the other hand, such as those imposed by the United 
Nations, severely limit alternative resource flows.  As such, increases in both severity and 
comprehensiveness should both increase the likelihood of incumbents’ resorting to 
repression.   This generates a second set of hypotheses: 
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H3: Overall, UN-imposed sanctions will be more likely to contribute to increased 
physical repression than US-imposed sanctions 
 
H4: More severe US-imposed sanctions will result in a greater likelihood of physical 
repression in developing state compared to less severe sanctions. 
 
H5: More severe UN-imposed sanctions will result in a greater likelihood of physical 
repression in developing state compared to less severe sanctions. 
 
Data and Operational Criteria 
Measuring Human Rights and State Repression 
While discussions of human rights-related issues are common in the fields of political 
science and foreign policy, no consensus as to their appropriate measurement exists.  Part of 
the inherent difficulty in measuring the level of human rights abuses present in a country 
comes from the ever-widening discourse regarding what are to be considered as human 
rights.  Customary international law, when speaking to the subject to human rights, tends to 
focus on protection of the physical person from heinous acts such as torture or extrajudicial 
execution.  This notion of human rights was formalized in the United Nations Charter ratified 
in 1945 and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights drafted in 1948.  Further iterations 
of “universally” accepted human rights norms were borne out in the two subsequent UN 
human rights conventions the Convent on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.  In recent years perceptions of human rights have 
evolved to include even educational and environmental rights.  Therefore, any attempt to 
accurately measure a states compliance with international human rights norms is necessarily 
fraught with difficulty and imperfection (see Gibney and Dalton, 1997; Lopez and Stohl, 
1992; Poe and Tate, 1994).   
                                                                                                                               
 
 
27
I have chosen to focus this analysis on the most clearly delineated aspect of human 
rights: respect for the integrity of the person or physical integrity rights.  This subset of 
human rights includes freedom from abuses such as torture, unlawful death, disappearance, 
and political imprisonment.  The dependent variable is the Political Terror Scale (PTS).  I 
rely on two existing datasets for the measures of physical repression for the years covered in 
this analysis.6  Gibney’s PTS dataset begins in 1980 and is updated annually (see Gibney and 
Dalton, 1997).  Poe and Tate, using the same criteria as Gibney, generated repression data for 
additional nations not included in the original PTS and expanded the coverage back to 1976 
for their own research needs (see Poe and Tate, 1994).  I integrate information from the two 
available datasets to produce data on physical repression in 126 developing states over 
twenty-six years.    The PTS measures the extent of state-sponsored repression and violations 
of physical integrity rights and is based on the annual reports of Amnesty International and 
the US State Department.  The five-point index of state repression used for the PTS is 
adapted from the standards developed by Gastil (1980).  A country scoring a one is under the 
secure rule of law and rarely commits acts of torture or political execution against its citizens 
(i.e. Canada or Costa Rica for most years).  A nation scoring a five on the scale places no 
limits on the “means and thoroughness” with which it pursues its goals.  Political executions 
and/or torture are commonplace, and all citizens regardless of their interest or involvement in 
political or civic life are subject to sever violations of their physical integrity (i.e. Iraq, 1990-
2000 or Rwanda, 1994-1998).7 
                                                
6   Gibney’s data are available on Mark Gibney’s home page: www.unca.edu/politicalscience/faculty-
staff/gibney.html.  Last accessed 21December 2005.  Poe and Tate’s data are available at 
www.psci.unt.edu/ihrsc/poetate.thm.  Last accessed 16 November 2005.  I thank to both parties for sharing their 
data. 
 
7   A complete description of each category is included in appendix 2. 
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As a final note, the PTS presents two separate measures, one based on Amnesty 
International Annual Country Reports, the other on the annual reports of the US State 
Department.  Despite the high correlation between the two measures (approximately 0.75 in 
this sample), there is some evidence of systematic deviation during some years.  A recent 
analysis examining the differences between measures based on the Amnesty International 
reports and those based on the US State Department reports (Poe, Vasquez and Carey, 2001) 
found some evidence of bias by the US State Department toward leftist governments during 
the 1980s.  That is, the reports generated by the US State Department were at times more 
critical of socialist and communist regimes compared to rightist governments or military 
dictatorships during the Regan and Bush years, but this bias diminishes in the early 1990s.   
 In the past, both measures as well as averages of the two have been used to measure 
the severity of physical repression.  I rely on the US State Department data because it offers 
more consistent coverage over the time period of analysis, providing scores for more 
countries and more years compared to the Amnesty International data.  The thoroughness of 
the State Department reports compared to the Amnesty International reports also suggests 
that the scores generated from the State Department reports may more accurately reflect the 
human rights conditions in the country.8 
 
Assessing the Severity of Sanctions 
I generate the list of US sanctioned countries from Hufbauer et al. (1990), The 
Institute for International Economics (1999), Hufbauer (1998), and Hufbauer and Oegg 
                                                
8   See Poe, Vasquez, and Carey, 2001 for full description and analysis of variations between Amnesty 
International and State Department Scores.   
    In order to compensate for possible bias and to check the robustness of the model, I also test the measures 
generated from the annual reports of Amnesty International (not reported) as the dependent variable.  The 
results are similar.  The exception is moderate UN sanctions, which differs from the original model.  
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(2000), and the US Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (2005).9  I compile 
information on UN Sanctions from the web page of the Office of the Spokesman for the 
Secretary General (2005).  While the simplest measure of sanctions would be a dummy 
variable indicating the presence of absence of sanctions, not all sanctions events are equal.  
The severity of sanctions events can range from diplomatic wrist slaps such as travel bans on 
key persons or groups to full economic embargoes.  As such, differentiation among the 
various types of sanctions events seems more appropriate than a simple dichotomous 
indicator.  I therefore develop a scale of the severity of US and UN sanctions imposed on the 
target country.   The severity of US-imposed sanctions is measured on a scale of 0 to 3 based 
on the following criteria: 
Level 0: No economic sanctions; normal economic relations. 
Level 1: The imposition of light sanctions such as the retraction of previously 
promised or delivered military or development aid. 
Level 2: The imposition of moderate sanctions such as arms embargoes, restrictions 
on the import or exports of primary commodities such as oil or manufactured goods, 
and/or other limited prohibitions against investment and trade.  
Level 3: Comprehensive economic sanctions such as embargoes on all or most 
economic activities between the US and the target nation. 
 
I include a similar scale to assess the severity of United Nations-imposed sanctions.  
Despite the differences in the scales, both are roughly congruent in their progression from no 
sanctions to comprehensive sanctions regime and should capture similar information about 
                                                
9 To check the robustness of this measure I also tested a model using a different sanctions dataset.  Marinov 
(unpublished) has developed a dataset for economic sanctions used to promote democracy.  His sanctions data 
is based on information taken from new reports and includes multilateral and unilateral sanctions events from 
1977-2004.  The results of the model employing this data set and the substantive interpretation of the results are 
similar to those of both the models presented here.   
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the influence of sanctions on a target country.  The scale for UN-imposed sanctions is as 
follows:     
Level 0: No economic sanctions; normal economic relations. 
Level 1: The imposition of light sanctions such as travel restrictions on a nation’s 
leadership, restrictions on air traffic into and out of the target country, or other 
diplomatic sanctions. 
Level 2: The imposition of targeted moderate sanctions such as arms embargoes, 
restrictions on key commodities such as diamonds or fuel, or the freezing of public 
and/or private assets.  
Level 3: Comprehensive economic sanctions such as embargoes on all or most 
economic activities between UN member states and the target nation. 
 
Table 3 shows the number of country-years sanctions of each level of severity described here 
have been applied by the US and the UN.  
Table 3: Sanctions Events 1976-2001 (by country year) 
Severity of Sanctions Event US UN Total 
Level 1: Diplomatic or Mild Economic Sanctions 224 16 240 
Level 2: Moderate Economic or Trade Sanctions 150 66 216 
Level 3: Comprehensive Sanctions 129 26 155 
Total 503 104 607 
 
Though an imperfect measure of the severity of sanctions, these categories provide 
some information as to the severity of the impact of sanctions on a target state.  As the 
severity of the sanctions regime increases, the level of physical integrity abuse is expected 
increase accordingly.   That is, the retraction of expected US foreign aid should result in a 
smaller increase in political repression compared to the imposition of comprehensive 
sanctions or a total US trade embargo.  Similarly, while the “sting” resulting from the UN’s 
imposition of travel restrictions or other primarily diplomatic sanctions on a nation’s 
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leadership is unlikely to provoke it to severe increases in human rights abuses, imposing 
comprehensive sanctions and virtually closing a state out of the global economic community 
is likely to produce a severe response from political elites as they attempt to shift the costs to 
citizens and ratchet up levels of repression in order to maintain control.    Finally, because the 
negative impact of sanctions on an economy is not generally immediately visible, any 
adverse effects resulting from sanctions imposed at t-1 are likely to produce changes in 
human rights violations at t or later.  Both sanctions variables are therefore lagged for one-
year to account for this delay and to control for endogeneity. 
   
Control Variables 
 The control variables included in this model are international conflict, civil war, 
democracy, level of economic development, economic growth, and population size.  Each of 
these variables, in some similar form, has previously been employed in models in which 
human rights or physical integrity was the dependent variable, and each is shown to exert a 
statistically significant effect on changes in human rights conditions. 
Previous studies of the predictors of human rights abuses have found a strong positive 
relationship between involvement in international conflict and human rights abuse (Poe and 
Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999).  Because of national security concerns and the danger posed by 
internal political division, regimes often employ more severe or repressive security measures 
than they would during peacetime; moreover, the greater the threat and the longer the 
duration of the war, the more repression is likely to increase.  International conflict is a 
dummy variable determined here by a score of 5 in the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MIDs) 
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data set, representing involvement in a conflict that has produced over 1000 battlefield 
deaths.   
Similarly, the presence of civil conflict has consistently demonstrated a strong 
negative impact on human rights conditions.  During a civil conflict, governments place 
additional restrictions on civil and human rights (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999).  
Human rights violations may increase during civil conflicts as governments resort to more 
severe means in order to secure stability, combat internal dissent, and retaliate against 
political violence.  Consequently, I hypothesize that state repression of physical integrity 
rights will increase during periods of civil conflict.  Civil war is coded as a dummy variable 
and is taken from the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) conflict dataset and 
reflects the existence of a conflict that produces1000 battlefield deaths per annum. 
Democracy has proven to be among the most significant predictors of respect for 
physical integrity rights within a nation (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; Poe and Tate 
1994; Poe et al., 1999).  In brief, owing to restraints on government authority and the ability 
of citizens to sanction government leaders that employ abuses tactics, higher levels of 
democracies should correlate to lower levels physical integrity abuse.  Countries whose 
institutions provide for popular participation in government, frequent turnover in executive 
and representative bodies, separation of powers, and the just rule of law typically exhibit a 
high level of respect for fundamental human rights and only infrequently the rights of their 
citizens.  Most previous quantitative studies of human rights have upheld this proposition.  
However, Christian Davenport and David Armstrong (2004) demonstrate that the 
relationship between levels of democracy and violations of physical integrity rights (a subset 
of human rights) is not linear.  Changes in respect for physical integrity do not incrementally 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
33
increase in tandem with movements toward democracy; rather, only states that have achieved 
a high level of democracy (greater than 7 on the Polity scale) show significant differences in 
their respect for these rights.   
I operationalize democracy as a binary variable coded as 0 (non-democratic) for 
countries scoring 6 and below and 1 (democratic) for countries scoring 7 or higher on the –10 
to 10 Polity2 score of the Polity IV dataset (Jaggers and Gurr).10  This simplifies 
interpretation of the effect of the variable and follows the recommendations of Jaggers and 
Gurr (1995, 479) and Alvarez et al. (1996).  In line with past research, I hypothesize that 
coded in this manner democracy will have a positive impact on human rights practices.    
Several studies have identified a relationship between economic development and 
human rights standards (Henderson, 1991; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999).  These 
studies suggest that higher levels of economic development, measured in GDP or GDP per 
capita, produce lower levels of physical repression.  Economic growth likewise positively 
affects state respect for human rights (Olson, 1963; Poe et al., 1999).  Specifically, as the 
“pie” increases and citizens have greater access to resources and wealth, instability decreases.  
As internal threats from disaffected factions of the population decrease, governments reduce 
repression.  Conversely, when GDP per capita falls and the pie shrinks—as is the case in 
sanctioned nations—instability and internal threat rise, and regimes tend toward greater 
repression.  Economic decline should correlate to an increase in state repression. I log GDP 
per capita in order to standardize it across the sample.  Economic growth is the percent 
                                                
10   I choose to operationalize democracy as 7 or higher on the Polity2 scale rather than using the more 
restrictive 8 demonstrated by Davenport and Armstrong to affect human rights condition.  I choose this measure 
because it is the standard practice in the discipline.  However, tests using democracy operationalized as Polity2 
> 7 show similar results.  
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change in the per capita GDP from year to year.  Both measures come from the United 
Nations Common statistics database.   
 Past studies of human rights and state repression have found that population size 
contributes to higher levels of state violence and human rights abuses (Poe et al., 1999).  This 
hypothesis is based on the notion that large populations absorb economic growth and 
increase stress on the government in their demands for public goods.  When a government 
cannot meet these demands civil unrest often occurs.   Faced with growing dissent and civil 
turbulence, governments are likely to resort to measures that are more repressive.  Increases 
in violations of physical integrity rights thus may occur as state security forces attempt to 
subdue opposition and restore order.  Larger populations may also simply provide more 
opportunities for state security forces or other government agents to repress the citizens of a 
country.   
Finally, human rights reports and indices relying raw events data or failing to control 
for population may capture total violations rather than risk to an individual.  States with large 
populations such as China, India, or Russia may therefore appear more systematic in their 
violations than states with smaller populations when in fact the per capita rate of violations is 
similar.   Based on previous research, I include an estimate of population size taken from the 
United Sanctions common statistics database.  I log this estimate in order to standardize it 
across the sample.  I hypothesize that larger populations will promote the use of physical 
repression in a developing country.  
Methodology 
In this paper, I employ ordered probit models to analyze the relationship between the 
imposition of sanctions and changes in human rights conditions.   Most previous research on 
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the correlates of human rights abuses has relied on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
analysis with control for autocorrelation via a lagged dependent variable (Apodaca, 2001; 
Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999).  Recently however, some scholars have argued that 
standard OLS models are not well suited to evaluating dependent variables with ordinal or 
interval scales (see for example Hafner-Burton, 2005; Richards et al., 2001).   Given the 
categorical nature of most existing measures of human rights, maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE) techniques are more appropriate for such research and improve upon past 
research that has relied on OLS regressions.  In this paper, I employ MLE techniques because 
it is methodologically appropriate given the categorical nature the nature of the dependent 
variable, and because it provides information regarding the likelihood that the application of 
sanctions on a developing nation will lead to an increase in violations of human rights.   
MLE methods offer a superior alternative to OLS regression given the nonlinear 
nature of the dependent variable.  However, the common issue of autocorrelation in analyses 
of time series data remains problematic.  In OLS regressions of time-series data, the inclusion 
of a lagged dependent variable has most commonly been used to control for this problem.  
Beck and Katz (1995) demonstrated the effectiveness and appropriateness of this technique 
as a means to control of autocorrelation in such models, and as a result, the inclusion of an 
independent variable representing a one-year lag of the dependent variable has become 
standard practice in quantitative studies of human rights.   In addition to controlling for 
autocorrelation, the lagged dependent variable has also shown substantive importance in 
human rights studies as it demonstrates the influence of recent history on human rights 
practices.  That is, states do not typically undergo a dramatic change in their human rights 
practices from year to year; rather, these changes take place gradually over a period of years.  
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Human rights conditions at t-1 are often the most significant predictor of human rights 
conditions at t.  The practice of lagging the dependent variable compensates for this path 
dependent relationship.   
Because of the nonlinear nature of the categorical dependent variable used here, 
however, lagging the dependent variable is not an appropriate method of controlling for 
autocorrelation (see for example Hafner-Burton, 2005).  However, Emilie Hafner-Burton has 
shown that the use of lagged binary indicators measuring a government’s previous level of 
repression is simple and effective substitute for the standard lagged dependent variable in 
MLE analyses.  This method accounts for “dependence across the categories of the 
dependent variable over time” and is more appropriate for logit and probit models than the 
typical lagged dependent variable (615, 2005).   
In order to assess the effects of sanctions on physical repression I test two similar 
models.  In the first model I use ordered probit estimation with the independent variables 
included as a 0-3 measure of severity of sanctions.  This shows the general relationship 
between sanctions and violations of physical integrity rights.  I am also interested, however, 
in the effects of sanctions at different levels of severity.  As such, in the second model I 
create a series of dummy variables to represent each level of sanctions severity 
independently.  This model allows me to examine the individual impact of specific types of 
sanctions—i.e. foreign aid retractions, moderate sanctions, or comprehensive sanction—on 
changes in government respect for physical integrity rights.  In both models, I use Huber 
(1967) and White (1980) robust standard errors clustered on the country to control for 
heteroskadasiticty.   
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Presented in equation form, the models used in this analysis are: 
Model 1 
Physical integrity (PTS)jt= constant a + B1 PTS4j (t-1) + B2 PTS3j (t-1) B3 PTS2j (t-1) B4 PTS1j (t-
1) + B5 Severity of US Sanctionsj(t-1) + B6 severity of UN sanctionsj(t-1) + B7 Democracyjt + B8 
Civil Warjt + B9 log GDP per capitajt + B10 Change in GDP per capitajt + B11 log 
Populationjt + e 
 
Model 2 
Physical integrity (PTS)jt= constant a + B1 PTS4j (t-1) + B2 PTS3j (t-1) B3 PTS2j (t-1) B4 PTS1j (t-
1) + B5 US Sanctions1j(t-1) + B6 US Sanctions2j(t-1) + B7 US Sanctions3j(t-1) + B8 UN 
sanctions1j(t-1) + B9 UN sanctions2j(t-1) + B9 UN sanctions3j(t-1) + B10 Democracyjt + B11 Civil 
Warjt + B12 log GDP per capitajt + B13 Change in GDP per capitajt + B14 log Populationjt + 
e 
 
A Note About Endogeneity and the Causal Arrow 
Before proceeding to the results, it is necessary to discuss endogeneity and the 
direction of causality.  Sanctions are externally imposed; however, the imposition of 
sanctions is partially endogenous to the actions of the targeted regime.  Given that human 
rights violations are often cited as a justification for sanctions, target states are likely to 
already commit some significant level of abuse and repression prior to the imposition of 
sanctions.  This then raises the question of causality.  One could argue that any observed 
increase in repression following the imposition of sanctions is simply an artifact of the pre-
existing climate of declining respect for human rights rather than related to the sanctions 
regime itself.  That is, sanctions could be the caused by increases in political repression and 
human rights violations, rather than the other way around.  I address this assertion in a 
number of ways.   
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First, while human rights-related language is frequently used as a justification for 
sanctions, it is far from the only reason why the UN and US have opted to impose sanctions.  
Other reasons include international conflicts, disagreements over international borders, 
failure to implement nuclear safeguards, violations of trade agreements, and complicity in 
illicit drug or arms trafficking (see Hufbauer et al. 1990; Hufbauer, 1998; IIE, 2005).   
These issues have little if any direct relationship to state-sponsored violations of human 
rights; moreover, these are the reasons for the imposition of sanction in the other 40% of 
cases.  As such, if sanctions correlated with an increase in human rights violations only in 
instances where human rights were already an issue, achieving statistical significance in a 
model including all sanctions events in a given time period would be particularly difficult.  
This is precisely the reason for including all sanctions events in this model.   
Second, the severity of sanctions seems not to correspond to the severity of abuse.  
Long before the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the Hussein regime proved itself one of the 
world’s most abusive regimes.  However, until that point neither the US nor the UN mounted 
any significant effort to sanction Iraq.  Similarly, Burundi and Chad have been plagued by 
civil violence, repressive governments, and gross violations of human rights for at least the 
last decade; however, neither the US nor UN have acted to impose substantial economic or 
diplomatic sanctions.  While the US frequently imposed sanctions against the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Block during the Cold War, since 1992 the US has only imposed sanctions once 
against a former-Soviet state—Azerbaijan.11  This observation is particularly revealing as 
violations of human rights have significantly worsened in many post-Soviet Republics since 
the early 1990s.  Most apparent have been the precipitous declines in Russia, Georgia, and 
                                                
11   These sanctions were imposed in order to halt an ongoing border war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over 
the Nagorno-Karabakh region. 
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some Central Asian states.  This suggests that the imposition of sanctions is not necessarily 
directly tied to the severity of human rights violations.  In fact, states exhibiting moderate 
levels of political violence and physical repression are almost as likely to be the target of US 
sanctions as are more severe abusers. 12  This diminishes the argument that sanctioned 
regimes are pre-selected based on the severity of abuse and lends support to the argument 
that sanctions may actually bear some responsibility for increases in human rights violations.   
Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the relationship between sanctions severity and observed level of 
state repression. 
 
Tables 4: State Repression of Human Rights and US Sanctions (by country year) 
Physical 
Repression 
Mild Sanctions Moderate Sanctions Comprehensive 
Sanctions 
Total 
1 0 0 0 0 
2 27 8 1 36 
3 86 43 52 181 
4 61 64 28 153 
5 44 33 31 108 
Total 218 148 112 478 
 
 
 
Table 5: State Repression of Human Rights and UN Sanctions (by country year) 
Physical 
Repression 
Diplomatic 
Sanctions 
Moderate Sanctions Comprehensive 
Sanctions 
Total 
1 0 3* 0 3 
2 1 4 1 6 
3 3 14 0 17 
4 6 16 5 27 
5 6 29 16 51 
Total 16 66 22 104 
* Applies to Arms Embargo imposed against Macedonia as part of a larger sanctions regime 
against all states of the Former Yugoslavia. 
 
                                                
12   I consider moderate abusers to fall into category 3 of the Political Terror Scale (PTS) while severe abusers 
would fall into levels 4 and 5.  These categories are described more fully in appendix 2. 
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Finally, even if states exhibiting frequent disregard for human rights are most often 
the target of sanctions, this does not suggest that sanctions do not contribute to the declining 
human rights environment.  Sanctions may force moderately abusive regimes to adopt even 
more repressive strategies in order maintain their positions of power.  Previous research has 
demonstrated that the best predictor of human rights conditions at time t are the conditions 
observed at t-1 (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al. 1999).  That is, states typically show little 
variance in terms of changes in respect for human rights from year to year.  A such, we can 
not assume that any increase in human rights violations is simply a natural degradation of the 
human rights conditions in the country.  Rather, some event or exogenous shock typically 
triggers the increased use of repression by the incumbent regime.  I argue that sanctions 
could serve as such a shock, prompting the regime to respond with more repressive measures 
than it employed in the past.   
Results 
The results of the ordered probit models are presented in Table 6.  The results of both 
tests provide support for the theoretical argument and hypotheses presented above.  
According to the ordered probit models tested here, the imposition of economic sanctions on 
developing countries contributes to increased violations of physical integrity rights in the 
target country.  This effect is clear for both Unites States and United Nations-imposed 
sanctions—in both cases, the application of economic sanctions on developing countries 
increases the likelihood of state-sponsored violations of physical integrity rights.  This result 
supports Hypotheses one and two. 
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Table 6: Results of ordered probit regression (with robust clustered standard errors) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
PTS4 0.245* (0.144) 0.238* (0.144) 
PTS3 -0.6069*** (0.143) -0.608*** (0.143) 
PTS2 -1.544*** (0.155) -1.541*** (0.155) 
PTS1 -2.918*** (0.189) -2.913*** (0.190) 
US sanctions 0.246*** (0.053)  
UN Sanctions 0.375** (0.157)  
US Sanct 1  0.377*** (0.117) 
US Sanct 2  0.582*** (0.132) 
US Sanct 3  0.597*** (0.183) 
UN Sanct 1  0.292 (0.328) 
UN Sanct 2  0.697* (0.365) 
UN Sanct 3  1.306** (0.656) 
International War 0.359** (0.180) 0.348** (0.175) 
Civil War 1.038*** (0.144) 1.022*** (0.147) 
Democracy -0.369*** (0.095) -0.370*** (0.096) 
Economic Development 0.013 (0.035) 0.012 (0.034) 
Economic Growth -0.015*** (0.004) -0.015*** (0.004) 
Population 0.172*** (0.218) 0.163*** (0.022) 
Pseudo R2  0.313 0.313 
Log likelihood -2908.94 -2906.34 
X2 1159.63, 12 degrees of freedom 1272.22, 16 degrees of freedom 
 
***P<0.001 **P<0.05 *P<0.10 (two-tailed test)  N=2891 country years.  Robust standard 
errors in parentheses.  All calculations conducted using Stata 8.0 (StataCorp, 2004). 
 
As expected, the coefficient for sanctions imposed by the United Nations is larger 
than the coefficient for the United States.  Consequently, UN sanctions are more likely to 
contribute to increased violations of physical integrity rights compared to US sanctions.  
These findings lend support to Hypothesis 3.  This result is not surprising as US sanctions 
only directly affect trade between two nations: the US and the target state.  The target state, 
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while blocked from certain economic transactions with what is likely a major trading partner, 
likely has recourse to other trade relationships.  For example, when the United States 
imposed extensive sanctions on Iran during the 1980s, European firms assumed much of the 
trade in oil previously conducted by US companies.  As such, the detrimental impact on the 
national economy of the target state can be mediated by pursuing trade with nations besides 
the US.  On the other hand, sanctions imposed by the UN apply to all UN member states.  
The target state thus has no practical alternatives and no legitimate substitute for lost trading 
partners.   Under such conditions, the target state suffers some tangible economic decline.   
Previous research has suggested that multilateral sanctions are more successful than 
unilateral sanctions at achieving foreign policy outcomes.  According to this literature, the 
impact of sanctions on a nation’s economic welfare depends on the extent to which the 
sanctions limit the target nation’s total access to trade (Bayard et al, 1983).   Multilateral 
sanctions are more likely to seriously erode the economy of the target state compared to 
unilateral sanctions.  Consequently, the further the economic decline, the more likely the 
sanctioned regime will increase physical repression.  UN sanctions imposed on South 
African apartheid regime in the late 1960 and strengthened through the 1970s and 1980s 
severely restricted the access of South African firms to the international market.  Continued 
trade restrictions and declining foreign investment because of UN sanctions (and coupled 
with unilateral sanctions) led to a 2.8% annual decline in GDP during the sanction period 
(Hufbauer et al., 1990: 233).  This trend only reversed after the retraction of international 
sanctions following democratic reforms on the part of the apartheid government.  Similarly, 
the UN embargo against Iraq—while not successful in altering the position of the regime—
had a dramatic negative impact on the nation’s economy.  During the more than then years of 
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economic sanctions, Iraq’s per capita GDP declined from approximately $2200 in 1990 to 
less than $700 by the end of the decade.      
The finding that both UN and US-imposed sanctions increase the likelihood of state-
sponsored physical repression is revealing.  However, it is also important to determine if this 
relationship occurs at different levels of sanction severity.  In order to evaluate the effects of 
different levels of sanctions on changes in physical repression, I tested a second model in 
which I disaggregated the different levels of sanctions into three separate dummy variables.  
These results reveal a more refined picture of the relationship between sanctions and physical 
repression.   
Like the previous model, Model 2 demonstrates that the imposition of sanctions on a 
developing state increases the likelihood of violations of physical integrity rights.  In general, 
the results show that as the severity of sanctions increase, the likelihood of a state to resort to 
physical repression also increases.  However, this relationship is not uniform between US 
and UN sanctions.  Sanctions imposed by the United States contribute to increases in human 
rights violations at all levels of severity, from the retraction of previously promised foreign 
aid (level 1) to complete economic embargos (level 3).  In addition, the coefficients for each 
category increase as the severity of sanctions increases, suggesting that the more severe the 
sanctions regime imposed by the US on a developing country, the greater the likelihood of 
violations of physical integrity rights.  This provides statistical evidence hypothesis 4.        
Turning to UN sanctions regimes, the results reveal that the relationship between 
sanctions and repression is dependent on the level of sanctions imposed.  Overall, the 
coefficients increase with the severity of the imposed sanction regime.  However, the p-value 
for the first category of UN sanctions does not approach standard levels of statistical 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
44
significance.  This is perhaps not surprising, as diplomatic sanctions do not directly constrain 
the resources available to incumbent leaders and their wining coalition.  Restrictions such as 
travel bans serve as clear signal of the international community’s dissatisfaction with a 
regime, but at most, they are likely to inconvenience leaders and political elites rather than 
constrain them.  Regardless of the regime’s ease of movement, so long as resource flows 
remain unimpeded, the cost of low-level UN sanctions to civilians seems low as well. 
Moderate UN sanctions such as arms and fuel embargoes and restrictions on specific 
commodities reach statistical significance at the 10% level, indicating that a relationship 
between this level of sanctions and increased human rights abuses exists.  However, the 
relative weakness of this relationship raises a number of questions.  Alternative specifications 
of this model (not reported here) reveal the fragility of the results for this level of UN 
sanctions.  When the Amnesty International reports are substituted as the dependent variable 
in place of the State Department scores, the p-values for moderate sanctions become 
insignificant at the 10% level.  This is also the case for changes in the civil war variable.  
When the threshold for battlefield deaths is lowered to 25 deaths per annum, the variable for 
moderate UN sanctions fails to reach statistical significance.  On the other hand, when the 
complete 21-point Polity2 score is substituted for the binary democracy variable, the results 
become significant at the 5% level.  These conflicting results suggest that further research 
into the effects of moderate sanctions is necessary.  The difference in significance may be 
driven by the introduction of targeted sanctions in the late 1990s.  Traditional sanctions likely 
produce a net negative effect; targeted sanctions may be successful at exerting pressure on 
incumbents and political elites without adversely effecting civilians.  While these results 
show moderate economic sanctions are somewhat related to an increased likelihood of 
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human rights violations, this analysis makes no distinction between smart sanctions and other 
types of import or export restrictions.  It is thus possible that this analysis misses the 
important distinction between targeted sanctions and other moderately severe economic 
restrictions.  Further refinement of the type of sanctions applied could improve our 
understanding of the effects of targeted sanctions on political repression.  Disaggregating 
smart sanctions from other import or export restrictions may revealing whether more 
carefully crafted regimes are in fact more sensitive to the human rights and humanitarian 
consequences of sanctions.       
The p-values for comprehensive UN sanctions, on the other hand, are consistently 
significant at the 5% level regardless of alternative specifications.  The substantive 
interpretation of these results is that while diplomatic sanctions imposed by the UN do not 
systematically relate to increases in state-sponsored repression, both moderate and 
comprehensive sanctions do exert some influence.  Moreover, the increase in the coefficients 
between moderate sanctions and comprehensive sanctions supports the hypothesis that 
increases in sanctions severity translate into greater threats to human rights.  In this model, 
the value of the coefficient for UN sanctions almost doubles between the second and third 
levels of sanctions, revealing a significant increase in magnitude of effect between the effects 
of arms and fuel embargos and comprehensive sanctions.  This provides support for 
hypothesis 5.  
Finally, the high value of the coefficient for comprehensive sanctions is not surprising 
as multilateral embargoes backed by international mandate have the effect of virtually 
locking the target state out of the international economic and diplomatic system.  The few 
high level sanctions regimes imposed on states during the 25 years included in the analysis 
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(South Africa or Iraq for example) stripped the target states of most forms of development 
and military aid, barred the states from most international trade, and cost the states even 
strategic diplomatic and military partners.  Under the austere economic conditions imposed 
by such sanctions, GDP growth slowed or reversed, prices increased, wages fell, and 
unemployment rose. Thus the impact of such harsh diplomatic and economic constraints was 
felt by all strata of society, and—initially at least—most heavily impacted the populace as 
opposed to political elites.  As popular support for the regime declines and discontent rises, 
violations of basic human rights increase as enact harsher measures to suppress political 
rivals.    
  The control variables included in this model generally function as expected and 
correspond to the results produced in previous studies of the correlates of respect for human 
rights.  First, the binary variables accounting for the previous year’s level of human rights 
abuse— the substitute for the lagged dependent used in OLS regressions—show statistical 
significance and are generally negatively correlated with an increase in abuses for the 1st 
through 3rd categories of repression.  The substantive meaning of this result is that past 
behavior influences present respect for human rights standards.  The absolute value of the 
coefficients also decreases as the previously observed level of abuse increases.  The 
exception to this is in the 4th category, representing significant physical repression affecting a 
large portion of the population. This variable only reaches significance at the 10% threshold; 
more importantly, the sigh on the coefficient is positive, revealing an opposite effect from 
that of lower levels of human rights repression.  The difference in the signs of coefficients for 
levels 1 through 3 and level 4 suggests that states with a recent history of respect for human 
rights are likely to continue respecting the physical integrity rights of their citizens and even 
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improve upon them while states with a recent history of violating the physical integrity rights 
of their citizens are more likely to worsen their behavior.  This observation improves upon 
the findings form previous studies that have relied upon a one-year lag of the dependent 
variable by illustrating that the direction of effect depends upon the states previous location 
on the scale of physical integrity abuse.  
In both models, international and civil wars are significant predictors of increased 
human rights violations in terms of both statistical significance and substantive impact.  In 
order to maintain stability, nations at war turn to repression.  While significant for both cases 
the magnitude of effect is greater for civil compared to international conflict.  The 
comparatively large coefficient demonstrates that the presence of a civil war dramatically 
increases the likelihood of increased state-sponsored violations of physical integrity rights.  
These results are consistent with past research that has demonstrated the significant 
correlation between both international and civil wars and violations of human rights.   
The democracy variable also achieves statistical significance and the sign of the 
coefficient is negative. In line with past results, democratic nations typically are more likely 
to respect physical integrity rights.  The result is not surprising since democratic governments 
that abuse the basic human rights and freedoms of their citizens are unlikely to garner the 
popular support needed to win elections. 
Economic growth likewise performed as expected.  Its coefficient is negative and it 
reaches levels of statistical significance.  This result suggests that as GDP increases, the 
likelihood of human rights violations declines.  Interestingly, however, per capita GDP does 
not have a statistically significant effect on violations of physical integrity rights.  This result 
is inconsistent with others analyses of economic factors associated with human rights, which 
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suggest that as per capita GDP increases, human rights violations decrease.  The reason for 
this inconsistent result may be that this analysis is limited to the developing world.  Most 
previous studies (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al., 1999) used a large sample that included the 
highly developed nations of Western Europe and North America whereas such nations were 
omitted from this analysis.  Consequently, it is likely that the inclusion of so many highly 
industrialized states with a long history of respect for human rights resulted in the observed 
statistical significance of per capita GDP in those and other studies.  However, it is still 
interesting that within the subset of nations included here—those with an average GDP of 
under $10,000—per capita GDP does not have a statistically significant effect on the 
likelihood state-sponsored physical repression.  Future research should perhaps address to 
what extent per capita income affects human rights, and determine if there exists a threshold 
for secure human rights similar to that identified for democracy (Przeworski and Limongi, 
1997).   Finally, the logged population size of a country is both statistically significant and 
positively correlated with increased likelihood of violations of physical integrity rights.  This 
suggests that the larger the population of a developing state the greater the probability of 
increased human rights violations. 
On balance, the imposition of economic sanctions on developing states increases the 
likelihood of increased state-sponsored violations of physical integrity rights.  For US 
sanctions, the likelihood of violations increases in tandem with the severity of the imposed 
regime.  UN sanctions, on the other hand, do not necessarily follow the same pattern.  The 
lowest level of UN sanctions—diplomatic sanctions—apparently has no statistical 
relationship to changes in state repression.  Moderate trade sanctions or restrictions on fuel or 
arms, however, increase the likelihood of physical repression.  This observation begs further 
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research in order to differentiate between smart sanctions and other import-export sanctions.  
Lastly, comprehensive economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations significantly 
increase the likelihood violations of physical integrity rights. 
Conclusion 
 This paper demonstrates that the imposition of US and UN sanctions frequently 
contributes to an increase in state-sponsored physical integrity violations.  The results reveal 
some interesting information about the differing effects of sanctions by type and by sender.  
This demonstration of the adverse and differing effects of sanctions on physical integrity 
rights is important both for normative and substantive reasons.  Both decision makers in the 
United States and representatives to the United Nations Security Council have a duty to 
design and implement policies that respect physical integrity and basic human rights 
whenever doing so is within political and economic limits.  It cannot be expected that the 
United States should attempt to cure all of the world’s humanitarian crises; however, as the 
sole remaining superpower and a self-described champion of human rights, the US should 
indeed work to reconcile its policy decisions with its stated values.  If sanctions inflict 
unnecessary harm on civilians, the United States should reconsider the imposition of 
sanctions as a “humane” foreign policy alternative.  Likewise, the Security Council, as the 
executive body of the United Nations, is charged with upholding both the letter and the spirit 
of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the cornerstone of international human rights law, 
makes clear the standards to which the United Nations and its member states should aspire.  
Sanctions that degrade economic and social conditions, deteriorate public health structures, 
or contribute to repression of basic human rights violate the “critical UN protective 
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provision” enshrined in the Article 1 of the UN Charter (Joyner, 2003).   The Security 
Council is not above the law, and actions taken by it that infringe upon or contribute to 
violations of human rights standards—such as comprehensive sanctions—necessarily exceed 
its mandate (Joyner, 2003; Reinisch, 2001).  As such, the Security Council should seek out 
alternatives to comprehensive sanctions and embargoes as a means of prompting changes in 
the domestic and foreign policy of states in violations international law.       
Furthermore, this analysis illustrates the divide between stated US objectives and 
actual results.  Sender states often couch the objective of sanctions in the language of 
humanitarianism and protection of human rights.  Sanctions, then, should produce these 
results in at least a substantial number of the cases in which they are applied.  Yet the 
empirical evidence reveals that sanctions rarely succeed in achieving such foreign policy 
goals.  More importantly, the evidence presented herein suggests that not only do economic 
sanctions often fail to improve the humanitarian situation in the target country, but rather 
frequently contribute to an increase in human rights abuses and a decline in physical security 
of the person when they are imposed on developing nations.  While sanctions may in fact 
succeed in some areas, the imposition of sanctions for the protection of human rights should 
be viewed as a failed or mis-specified policy decision that should be seriously reconsidered. 
This paper also reveals a number of avenues for future research.  First, while this 
paper has demonstrated that sanctions can affect the frequency and severity of human rights 
repression and abuse, the picture is incomplete.  A more complex model that can further 
remove the effects of the endogenous variables could clarify the relationship between 
sanctions and state-sponsored violations of physical integrity rights.  That is, sanctions are 
applied most often imposed upon states that already exhibit a history of at least some 
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significant level of systematic human rights violations.  Second, to more clearly delineate 
causal mechanisms and refine our understanding of the relationship between bilateral and 
multilateral sanctions and changing human rights conditions, a more exact measure of human 
rights conditions is needed.  Currently available indices of human rights violations cannot 
account for subtle changes in a nation’s respect of human rights by states or clearly and 
consistently identify the actors primarily responsible for violations.13  As such, any analysis 
of human rights conditions suffer from limitations in available quantitative data.  The 
creation of a more refined dataset that accounts for fine changes in human rights conditions 
and disaggregates state-sponsored violations from violations caused by non-state or extra-
state actors could further research in this area and contribute to our understanding of the 
correlates of human rights abuses.  Finally, this model has given partial support for the notion 
that targeted sanctions may be less detrimental to the civilian population of sanctioned states.  
Diplomatic sanctions seem to have no statistically significant relationship to changes in 
levels of state repression.  Disaggregating targeted sanctions from other forms of moderate 
sanctions could provide important information regarding the ability of the United Nations to 
affect political elites while shielding civilians from the negative impact of sanctions.  
Sanctions have increasingly become a tool of foreign policy for both states and the 
international organizations.  Yet given the evidence of their detrimental effects on civilian 
populations, the need for new tactics or improvements in existing sanction strategies is 
                                                
13   The Political Terror Scale discussed here as well as the CIRI human rights database constructed by 
Cingranelli and Richards both suffer from similar problems.  While the CIRI scale is perhaps more systematic 
in its assessment and provides more categories of abuse, it is an additive scale of human rights abuses that 
counts raw events in order to generate country scores.  As such, it fails to control for population size and other 
factors necessary to understand the risk posed to an individual citizen of a given country.  The Political Terror 
Scale implicitly considers violations relative to population size; however, the lack of clearly identifiable coding 
rules limits the accuracy and reliability of the measure.   As well, both indexes focus on abuses committed by 
state actors.  Non-state actors contribute significantly to the overall human rights conditions within a state.  The 
development of a scale that clearly separates the actions of state from non-state actors and includes separate 
measures of each would therefore be a major advancement in the field of human rights research.   
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apparent.  While sanctions may still provide a positive alternative to armed intervention, 
policy makers should further refine the stipulations of sanctions in order to minimize the 
collateral damage inflicted upon civilians and increase the specificity of sanctions to target 
directly the leadership of a state.  Targeted sanctions imposed by the UN may contribute to 
less humanitarian hardship than more comprehensive sanctions.  Smart sanctions regimes 
may also be able to exert pressure on political elites without expressly leading to increased 
political repression.  However, more research into both the effectiveness of such sanctions 
and means to control the likelihood of the adverse effects they often cause is necessary 
before the international community can comfortably adopt economic sanctions as a humane 
and effective tool of international diplomacy and foreign policy. 
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Appendix 1: Countries Included in Sample 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Bangladesh 
Belarus 
Benin 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bosnia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic of / Zaire 
Congo, Republic of the 
Costa Rica 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czechoslovakia 
Czech Republic 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Eritrea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary  
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Israel 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Korea, Democratic People's 
Republic of 
Korea, Republic of 
Kyrgyzstan 
Laos 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar (Burma) 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Peru 
Papua-New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Philippines 
Poland 
Romania 
Russia/USSR 
Rwanda 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Slovakia 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka  
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Syria 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Tunisia  
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Yugoslavia 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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Appendix 2: Detailed Description of PTS Categories 
 
Level 1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and 
torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare. 
 
Level 2:  There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. 
However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is 
rare. 
 
Level 3:  There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. 
Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, 
with or without a trial, for political views is accepted. 
 
Level 4:  The practices of level 3 are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances, 
and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects 
those who interest themselves in politics or ideas. 
 
Level 5:  The terrors of level 4 have been expanded to the whole population. The leaders of 
these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal 
or ideological goals. 
 
*Source: Gibney and Dalton, 1997. 
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